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A survey is provided of options for legal implementation of space
debris mitigation measures. United States Federal regulatory agencies
have the authority to impose mitigation requirements on commercial
satellite and launch vehicle operators, subject to proper rulemaking
proceedings. Existing international organizations, while possessing the
appropriate authority, do not provide fora to resolve the debris problem
in an effective and timely fashion. A conference of spacefaring nations
is offered as an alternative. Only space debris from civil and commer-
cial missions is addressed.
INTRODUCTION
The failure of current law to address adequately the problem of space
debris is evidenced by the ever-increasing amount of Earth-orbital deb-
ris.' This fact has prompted legal scholars and practitioners around the
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Law, The American University; Candidatus Juris, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway,
1981; LL.M., McGill University Air & Space Law Institute, 1983. The author is co-
chairman of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Legal Subcom-
mittee on Space Debris.
1. More than seven thousand space objects are currently being tracked by the
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). These objects are being
catalogued. Only 5% of the catalogued objects are operational spacecraft. The rest is
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
world to work with space engineers, project directors, and policymak-
ers, to help find ways to remedy the situation. One such effort is under-
way at the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
(AIAA). On May 4, 1989, the AIAA's Legal Aspects Committee,
formed a Subcommittee on Orbital Debris.' Although this article is
based in part on the discussions and findings of the Subcommittee, the
conclusions are the author's alone, because the Subcommittee has not
yet completed its work.
The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of options for,
and approaches to, future legal participation in the resolution of the
orbital debris problem. Effective resolutions, or solutions, lie in the
standardization and legal implementation of technically feasible and
economically sound orbital debris mitigation practices at an appropri-
ate time in the future. Debris mitigation practices refer to spacecraft
design and operating procedures intended to limit the debris genera-
tion, such as shifting to a higher, so-called "graveyard," orbit of inoper-
ational geostationary satellites, and deorbiting low-Earth orbit satellites
and launch vehicle upper stages. To some extent, such measures al-
ready are being taken by industry and governments and could be man-
dated in the United States as a matter of United States domestic law,
and universally, as a matter of international law.
The scope of this article is limited. Its focus is Earth-orbital debris,
rather than space debris in general, simply because a solution is more
space debris in one form or another. Operational space debris, that is, objects intention-
ally discarded during space missions, such as satellite launch and deployment, includ-
ing, for example, payload shrouds, comprises 12%. Spent intact rocket bodies account
for 14%; inactive payloads, (typically, inoperational satellites) 20%; and fragmenta-
tion debris, 45 %. INTERAGENCY GROUP (SPACE) OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUN-
CIL REPORT ON ORBITAL DEBRIS 3, 6-8 (Feb. 1989) [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL REPORT]. See also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ORBITAL DEBRIS:
A SPACE ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM, [and] SPACE DEBRIS WORKING GROUP, EURO-
PEAN SPACE AGENCY (ESA) (Sept. 1988) (providing more information on the orbital
debris environment).
Fragmentation debris stems from spacecraft explosions and collisions. To date, all
collisions between operational spacecraft have been deliberate. Typically, collisions take
place in the context of anti-satellite-satellite (ASAT) or ballistic missile defense test-
ing. On the other hand, several unintended explosions have occurred, e.g., in spent
rocket bodies (rocket upper stages) that failed to reenter the atmosphere and that con-
tained residual fuel. Residual fuel often remains in rocket bodies after successful
launching and leaves them prone to explosions. For example, on October 4, 1990, a
Chinese rocket body from a CZ-4 launch fragmented while in a circular (850-900 km)
sun-synchronous orbit. The CZ-4 launch vehicle had successfully completed the
launching of a satellite and two "balloons" on September 3, 1990. Late Breaking News,
ORBITAL DEBRIS MONITOR, Oct. 1990, at 3.
2. The Subcommittee's mandate is: (1) to provide a survey of existing law relevant




urgently needed for the Earth-orbital environment. Furthermore, debris
resulting from military space activities is not addressed. The failure to
deal with such debris reflects no attempt to diminish the significance of
the problem of military space debris, but simply the fact that setting
standards for the military raises an entirely new and complex set of
national security and political issues, particularly at the international
level. Consequently, this paper concentrates on legal solutions to the
problems of civil-primarily commercial-space debris.
I. SPACE DEBRIS AND EXISTING LAW
General agreement exists in the United States, as well as in the in-
ternational, legal community that current law does not adequately ad-
dress the issue of orbital debris. United States domestic regulatory re-
gimes governing private commercial space activities3 do not mandate
debris mitigation measures.4 Moreover, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) appears to have adopted an ad hoc ap-
proach to space debris and, in fact, is opposed to comprehensive stan-
dards of conduct aimed at debris mitigation. Ironically, NASA also
recognizes that debris poses one of the greatest threats to the
survivability of the planned international Space Station.
Public international law is simply insufficient to resolve the debris
problem. A handful of provisions, scattered largely throughout a body
of space treaties,5 provides little more than general discouragement and
vague admonitions to would-be space polluters. For example, the
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
3. See The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, 49 U.S.C. App. §§ 2601-23
(1990) (providing information on launch vehicles); The Land Remote-Sensing Com-
mercialization Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4201-92 (1990) (providing information on
remote-sensing satellites); [and] The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-
55 (1990) and the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-44 (1990)
(setting forth licensing regimes for communications satellites).
4. See generally Baker, Space Debris: Law and Policy in the United States, 60 U.
CoLo. L. Rnv. 55 (1989) (describing United States law and policy on space debris).
5. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty];
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of the Astronauts, and the Return
of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No.
6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue Agreement]; Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389,
T.I.A.S. No. 7762 [hereinafter Liability Convention]; Convention on Registration of
Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. 8480
[hereinafter Registration Convention]; and Agreement Governing the Activities of
States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of 1979, G.A. Res. 34/68 (Dec. 5,
1979) reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1434 (1979) [hereinafter Moon Treaty].
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tion and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies (Outer Space Treaty),' which addresses environmental issues in
more detail than any of the other space treaties, is silent on space deb-
ris. Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty speaks of "harmful contami-
nation" of the celestial bodies and of "adverse changes in the environ-
ment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial
matter." The preparatory works of the Outer Space Treaty suggest,
however, that "harmful contamination" refers to biological contamina-
tion, and not to space debris.
To attempt to apply to space debris other provisions of the Outer
Space Treaty-such as requirements for "cooperation and mutual as-
sistance" 7 in the conduct of space activities or for consultation where
one state's space activities "would cause potentially harmful interfer-
ence" with those of another state-is even more far-fetched. First,
these provisions were not intended to control space debris; and second,
the provisions do not contain strong legal obligations that could be re-
lied on to protect the space environment beyond the twentieth century. 8
Moreover, the Convention on Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects (Liability Convention), 9 which is designed inter alia, to com-
pensate those whose space objects are damaged in space, probably does
not even apply to most kinds of space debris. 10 The Liability Conven-
tion applies when damage is caused by a "space object.""" It is very
unlikely that this term, as defined in the Convention, 12 would encom-
pass, for example, operational or fragmentation debris, which together
6. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5.
7. Id. at 2416-17.
8. See, e.g., Ospina, Outer Space: 'Common Heritage' or 'Common Junkyard' of
Mankind, XXX PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTiETH COLLOQUIUM OF THE INT'L INST. OF
SPACE L. 228; McCloud, Space Pollution, XXX PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH
COLLOQUIUM OF THE INT'L INST. OF SPACE L. 142; Reibel, Prevention of Orbital Deb-
ris, XXX PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH COLLOQUIUM OF THE INT'L INST. OF SPACE
L. 147; Gorove, Space Debris in International Legal Perspective, XXXII PROCEEDINGS
OF THE THIRTY-SEcoND COLLOQUIUM OF THE INT'L INST. SPACE L. 97; and Okolie,
International Law for the Protection of Outer Space, XXXII PROCEEDINGS OF THE
THIRTY-SECOND COLLOQUIUM OF THE INT'L INST. SPACE L. 123 (providing basic dis-
cussions of the space treaties in the context of space debris).
9. Liability Convention, supra note 5.
10. See Baker, Liability for Damage Caused in Outer Space by Space Refuse,
XIII ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 183 (1988).
11. See Liability Convention, supra note 5, art. III (applying fault-based liability).
This section applies in the event "damage is caused elsewhere than on the surface of
the Earth to a space object of one launching State... [or] by a space object of another
launching State . . . ." Id.
12. See id. art. I(d) (defining space object). The definition of "space object" in-




make up about sixty percent of the orbital environment.13 It is even
unclear whether it would encompass spent rocket bodies and inactive
payloads. The preparatory works of the Liability Convention indicate
that the drafters contemplated operational spacecraft as damage-caus-
ing objects. Moreover, due to problems of identification of space debris,
recovery may elude the victim even if the Liability Convention does
apply.
Domestic and international commercial contracts generally do not
address the issue of space debris. For example, transactions, such as
spacecraft procurement contracts and launch services agreements are
not concerned with the debris mitigation techniques, because no such
design standards or operating procedures are mandated by law. Fur-
thermore, satellite launch contracts and insurance policies, so far, have
not included damage by space debris as a reason to disclaim liability.
II. ORBITAL DEBRIS MITIGATION MEASURES: LEGAL
IMPLEMENTATION
A. DEBRIS MITIGATION MEASURES
Debris mitigation measures refer to spacecraft design and operating
procedures aimed at reducing space debris from geostationary and low-
Earth orbit satellites, as well as launch vehicle operations. Geostation-
ary and low-Earth orbit satellites become potential debris hazards
when they are no longer operational, and telemetry, tracking, and com-
mand from the ground ceases. Left to drift in relatively congested or
heavily-trafficked orbital paths, these objects pose a risk of collision. To
minimize or eliminate this risk, geostationary satellites may be shifted
to higher orbits and low-Earth orbit satellites can be deorbited by con-
trolled reentry into the Earth's atmosphere where friction with the at-
mosphere causes them to disintegrate and "burn-up." 4
Launch vehicle upper stages are potentially a great source of debris
because excess propellants and pressurants leave them prone to explo-
sions. To minimize this risk, upper stages can be designed to reenter or,
alternatively, to expel excess propellants and pressurants. To reduce
further the debris generated by launchings, it is possible to minimize
the number of independent parts allowed to reach orbit, secure parts to
upper stages, and employ payload shrouds to contain the satellite or
other payload. 5
13. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (describing the orbital environment).
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B. UNITED STATES DOMESTIC LAW
It appears that both the Federal Communication Commission and
the Department of Transportation's Office of Commercial Space Trans-
portation (OCST), federal agencies charged with regulating commer-
cial telecommunications satellites and launch vehicle operations, re-
spectively, have authority pursuant to their charters to impose debris
mitigation requirements. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration (NOAA), which licenses remote-sensing satellites, may
impose such requirements, as well, subject to approval by the President
of the United States. 6 None of these agencies, however, has yet taken
formal initiatives with respect to debris mitigation.
1. The Federal Communications Commission: Telecommunication
Satellites
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission)'"
licenses and regulates commercial telecommunications satellites under
the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.' 8 The FCC assumed
jurisdiction over satellites in the early 1970s, when it first granted ap-
plications by private companies to launch and operate satellites."9
Satellites fall within the scope of the FCC's licensing authority because
they are considered radio stations, which is what the Commission was
established to regulate.20
To date, the FCC has not attempted to regulate the debris aspects of
telecommunications satellite operations. That is, it has not formally im-
posed requirements on satellite licensees for disposal of satellites at the
end of useful life (a stage normally reached by commercial geostation-
ary satellites after about ten years of operation) for two reasons: first,
the Commission has felt that it lacks adequate technical basis for
adopting a standard; and second, the Commission has not considered a
standard to be urgent because, as a practical matter, several major sat-
ellite operators routinely boost their geostationary satellites to higher
16. See infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements
NOAA imposes on parties who need to dispose of satellites).
17. The FCC is an independent regulatory agency created by the Communications
Act of 1934. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1990).
18. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-52 (1990).
19. See Domestic Communications Satellite Facilities, 22 F.C.C.2d 86 (1970)
(DOMSAT I), 35 F.C.C.2d 844 (1972) (DOMSAT II), recon. in part, 38 F.C.C.2d
665 (1972) (DOMSAT III) (providing for the authorization of private communications
satellite operations).
20. 47 U.S.C. § 151-52 (1990).
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orbits at the end of life. Satellite operators typically inform the Com-
mission by letter when the orbital shift has taken place.
In any event, it appears that the Commission does have the authority
to prescribe rules for disposal of telecommunications satellites at the
end of life, should it decide to do so. This authority is based on the
premise that a drifting satellite could collide with an operational satel-
lite and impede "communications by. . .radio,"2' which the Commis-
sion is charged to secure and regulate.22 Because the main thrust of the
Commission is to promote foreign and interstate communications by
wire and radio, it would seem not to be inappropriate for the Commis-
sion to regulate inoperational communications hardware to the extent it
might interfere with, or interrupt, communications. A collision between
an operational satellite and one that is inoperational or, indeed, with
debris from a previous collision between satellites, would cause pre-
cisely such a disruption of radio communications.
The Commission has general authority to make rules and establish
conditions of license. 23 Section 303(r) of the Communications Act pro-
vides that the Commission may: "[m]ake such rules and regulations
and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with
law, as may be necessary to carry out provisions of this Act ....1,24
The Commission has used its general authority to regulate telecom-
munications satellites, as well as the more specific authority to
"[d]etermine the location of. . . [radio] stations,"2 5 and to prescribe
specific locations for each satellite in the geostationary orbit .2 Accord-
ingly, the Commission assigns each satellite licensee a specific orbital
location based on orbital deployment plans. For example, the Commis-
sion has determined that domestic-fixed satellites operating in the 4/
6GHz and 12/14GHz frequency band, respectively, shall be spaced
two-degrees apart, within a segment of the orbital arc from 64 to 143
degrees West Longitude.27 Furthermore, as a general matter, the Com-
mission always reserves the right, as a condition of each satellite oper-
ating license issued by it, to order the licensee to relocate the satellite
on thirty days notice.28
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1990).
24. Id.
25. 47 U.S.C. § 303(d) (1990).
26. Id.
27. Assignment of Orbital Locations to Space Stations in the Domestic-Fixed Sat-
ellite Service, 84 F.C.C.2d 129 (1983).
28. See 47 C.F.R. § 25.202(d) (1990) (stating that the FCC may issue a summary
order requiring space stations to change orbital locations on thirty days notice).
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To be accurate, it must be emphasized that the Commission's regula-
tion of satellites and the orbit is based on considerations that do not
encompass debris, namely, the avoidance of harmful electrical interfer-
ence between radio transmissions. Nevertheless, in light of the discus-
sion above, it appears reasonable to conclude that the FCC could re-
quire licensees: (1) to shift geostationary satellites to higher (to be
determined) orbits, and (2) to deorbit low-Earth orbit satellites by con-
trolled reentry. Such requirements could become part of the Commis-
sion's rules, for example Parts 25 and 100 of Title 47 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, which apply to domestic-fixed, radio-determina-
tion, and direct broadcasting satellites.
2. The Office of Commercial Space Transportation: Launch Vehicles
The Office of Commercial Space Transportation 29 licenses commer-
cial launch operations pursuant to the Commercial Space Launch Act
of 1984, as amended. 30 No provision in the Act or in the implementing
regulations" refers specifically to space debris, although the OCST, to
some extent, does consider the debris aspect of the launch operation as
part of its overall launch safety assessment during the licensing process.
It appears that the OCST has sufficient authority to impose vehicle
design and operating requirements. Under Section 7 of the Commercial
Space Launch Act, the OCST, aimed at reducing orbital debris, is au-
thorized to license launch operations "consistent with the public health
and safety, [and the] safety of property . . . ."3 On the premise that
space debris resulting from launch operations poses a potential risk to
the safety of property, (i.e., other space objects) mandating measures to
reduce debris generation seems to be well within the scope of the
OCST's authority. As a general matter, the OCST is authorized to "is-
sue such regulations . . . as may be necessary to carry out this Act." 83
Consequently, the OCST could amend its rules (subject to proper
rulemaking procedures) to require licensees, as a condition of license,
for example: (1) to employ upper stages that are guaranteed to reenter
29. The OCST is an office within the Department of Transportation, which was
established to license launch vehicles under delegated authority. The Department of
Transportation was designated by the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 as the
lead agency for the regulating and licensing of launch vehicles. 49 U.S.C. § 2602(3)
(1990).
30. 49 U.S.C. § 2601 (1990).
31. Office of Commercial Space Transportation, Department of Transportation, 14
C.F.R. §§ 400-15 (1990).
32. 49 U.S.C. § 2606 (1990). See also id. § 2601(7) (discussing, specifically, the
safety of property).
33. Commercial Space Launch Act, § 13, 49 U.S.C. App. § 2612 (1990).
[VOL. 6:203210
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or, alternatively, expel excess propellants and pressurants from spent
upper stages; (2) to take all possible measures to minimize the number
of launch vehicle independent parts allowed to reach orbit and secure
parts to upper stages; and (3) to employ payload shrouds, which would
contain the payload. Prior to mandating such requirements, however,
the OCST will have to consider the consequential economic burdens
and performance penalties which States launch vehicle operators may
suffer.
The authority to impose debris reduction requirements probably ex-
tends also to payloads that are not subject to the jurisdiction of the
FCC or NOAA because the mission review, as part of the launch vehi-
cle consideration, encompasses such payloads.34 Payloads that are not
subject to FCC or NOAA jurisdiction include, for example, micro-
gravity and foreign payloads. Imposing stringent requirements on for-
eign payloads, however, may place the United States launch industry at
a competitive disadvantage in the world market. For example, if the
OCST were to require that all geostationary satellites launched on
United States vehicles be boosted to higher orbits at the end of life,
foreign governments or companies not prepared to detract from the op-
erational life of the satellite to save fuel for the orbital shift, might
simply select non-United States launch providers.
3. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: Remote-
Sensing Space Systems
NOAA 5 licenses commercial remote-sensing systems, e.g. satellites,
pursuant to the Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984
(Landsat Act) . 6 No provision of the Act or the implementing regula-
tions37 refers specifically to space debris. Furthermore, because NOAA
has not yet granted a single application for a remote-sensing satellite
license, no precedent exists for how NOAA would deal with the debris
issue. Nevertheless, it appears that NOAA does have jurisdiction with
respect to the disposal of satellites at the end of life. Any rules NOAA
proposes, however, will be subject to approval by the President of the
United States. Pursuant to Section 402(b), any license issued by
34. Commercial Space Launch Act, § 6(b)(2), 49 U.S.C. § 2605(b)(2) (1990). See
also 14 C.F.R. § 416.21 (1990) (providing implementing regulations for the Office of
Commercial Space Transportation).
35. NOAA is part of the Department of Commerce (DOC). The DOC was desig-
nated as the lead agency for the licensing of remote-sensing satellites under the Land-
sat Act. 15 U.S.C. § 4241 (1990).
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4201-92 (1990).
37. Licensing of Private Remote-Sensing Space Systems, 15 C.F.R. § 960 (1990).
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NOAA "shall specify ... that the license shall ... (3) upon termina-
tion of operations under the license, make disposition of any satellites
in space in a manner satisfactory to the President."38
The written legislative history of the Landsat Act does not elucidate
why a reference was made to the President. One individual involved
with drafting the legislation, however, provided the following account
of a closed session discussion. Three items were considered in the con-
text of the provision cited above on disposal of satellites at the end of
life: nuclear power sources, transfer of technology, and debris. It was
felt that the two former items were of such importance that they should
be dealt with at the highest level, thus, the reference to the President.
Consequently, it would seem that NOAA could decide in individual
cases, as well as make rules, subject to Presidential approval, how a
licensee will dispose of a satellite at the end of life. For example,
NOAA could, as a condition of license, require a licensee to deorbit the
satellite, by controlled reentry, at the end of the license term.
C. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
are international organizations well equipped to develop spacecraft de-
sign and operating standards aimed at reducing debris. A conference or
meeting of spacefaring nations is offerred as an alternative to
COPUOS and ITU.
1. The Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
COPUOS has promulgated five treaties 9 and two resolutions40 gov-
erning space activities, and is about to complete a set of principles on
nuclear power sources in space. This international body has the author-
ity to deal comprehensively with all aspects of the debris issue. The
reason COPUOS has not already taken action with regard to space
debris is that certain important COPUOS member states, among them
the United States, have opposed it.
38. 15 U.S.C § 4242(b)(3). NOAA's implementing regulations provide that the
licensee has agreed to dispose of [the satellite] in a satisfactory manner. 15 C.F.R. §
960.11(d) (1990).
39. See supra note 5 (providing citations to the five major space treaties).
40. Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for Inter-
national Direct Television Broadcasting, G.A. Res. 37/92, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
51) at 98-99, U.N. Doc. A/37/646 (1982); Principles on Remote Sensing of Earth




Although, so far, the opponents have prevailed, increasingly coun-
tries are calling for space debris to be placed on the COPUOS agenda.
Notably, at a COPUOS annual meeting held June 4 to June 14, 1990,
the Chairman, Dr. Peter Jankowitsch, stated: "I think it is only fair to
bring [the space debris] problem in all its dimensions before a commit-
tee that sooner or later will have to face the legal and technical
changes on an issue extricably linked to the further development on
space research and space application." 411
If COPUOS does decide to take up the debris problem, it may con-
cern itself with all aspects of the issue, including design standards and
operating procedures, as well as liability for damage. For example,
COPUOS may establish requirements for: (1) end-of-life maneuvers
with respect to all types of satellites; (2) launch vehicle operating pro-
cedures to guarantee reentry of upper stages or to ensure expulsion of
excess propellants and pressurants from spent upper stages that do not
reenter; (3) the use of payload shrouds; and (4) limiting the number of
spacecraft independent parts allowed to reach orbit. COPUOS can
amend existing space treaties or adopt a new treaty or principles of
conduct. In either case, it would be necessary to ensure that damage
caused by the space debris is actionable. As mentioned earlier, it is
unclear to what extent the Liability Convention covers damage caused
by debris.42
2. The International Telecommunication Union: Telecommunications
Satellites
Pursuant to the International Telecommunications Convention, 43 the
ITU serves three primary functions also with respect to satellites: (1) it
allocates radio frequencies for use by satellites;4" (2) it provides a regu-
latory framework for technical coordination to prevent harmful inter-
ference between satellite transmissions; 45 and (3) it affords interna-
tional protection from radio interference between satellite transmissions
through a system of registration." Incident to its frequency allocation,
41. Extract from Prepared Statement by Dr. Peter Jankowitsch, COPOUS 33rd
Session, New York, New York (June 4, 1990).
42. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text (explaining the limited applicabil-
ity of the Liability Convention to space debris).
43. International Telecommunication Convention, done at Nairobi (1982), entered
into force Jan. 1, 1984 [hereinafter ITU Convention]. The Convention was not ratified
by the United States until December 1985. S. ExEc. REP. No. 4, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1986).
44. Id. art. 4.2(a).
45. Id. art. 4.2(b), (g).
46. Id. art. 4.2(a).
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coordination, and registration responsibilities, the ITU exercises juris-
diction over the geostationary orbit.47 Although the ITU normally does
not determine the locations of satellites in the orbit (the individual
member state does), it has the authority to do so, and has exercised
such authority on at least two occasions. 8
The ITU has not formally considered procedures for disposal of
satellites at the end of life. While several countries have called for an
ITU policy of removal of non-operational geostationary satellites, states
that consider such a move premature, including the United States, have
prevailed so far.
Arguably, the ITU has authority to deal with the space debris issue,
at least with respect to geostationary satellites at the end of life. A
similar rationale to that used to justify the FCC's authority over non-
operational satellites applies also to the ITU, namely, that such satel-
lites may collide with operational ones and impede radio communica-
tions, which the ITU is charged to safeguard and promote.
Pursuant to the International Telecommunications Convention, the
purposes of the ITU are to: "[m] aintain and extend international coop-
eration among all Members of the union for the improvement and ra-
tional use of telecommunications of all kinds . . ." [and] "to harmo-
nize the actions of Member nations in the attainment of these ends;"510
[and] "coordinate efforts with a view to harmonizing the development
of telecommunications facilities, notably those using space techniques,
with a view to full advantage being taken of their possibilities." 1
47. The ITU exercises jurisdiction over the geostationary orbit, although it has no
actual authority to do so. See Christol, The Modern International Law of Outer Space,
435-50 (1984) (describing the lack of actual authority which the ITU possesses over
the geostationary orbit). See also Jakhu, The Legal Status of the Geostationary Orbit
7 ANN. OF AIR & SPACE L. 333 (1982) (detailing the legal issues surrounding the use
of the geostationary orbit and the lack of clear, accepted jurisdiction over the orbit).
48. Orbit and frequency allotment plans assigning frequencies and orbital positions
to individual member states were adopted at the World Administrative Radio Confer-
ence for the Planning of the Broadcasting Satellite Service, Geneva (1977) and at the
Regional Administrative Radio Conference for the Planning of the Broadcasting Satel-
lite Service in Region 2. The plans were incorporated into the Final Acts, WORLD
ADMINISTRATIVE RADIO CONFERENCE (WARC), Geneva (1979) and the Final Acts,
WORLD ADMINISTRATIVE RADIO CONFERENCE ON THE GEOSTATIONARY-SATELLITE
ORBIT AND THE PLANNING OF SPACE SERVICES UTILIZING IT, Geneva (1985).
49. ITU Convention, supra note 42, art. 4.1(a).




3. Conference of Spacefaring Nations
A meeting or conference of spacefaring nations could be convened
for the purpose of negotiating and concluding a multilateral agreement,
series of bilateral agreements, or simply a set of guidelines, on space-
craft design and operating procedures aimed at reducing space debris.
The participants could include all countries and international organiza-
tions which actually operate or whose citizens operate spacecraft, or a
more limited group. The mandate for such a conference could be broad
(i.e., to consider all aspects of space debris, including liability) or could
be focused more narrowly. Moreover, the participants would have to
decide on the degree of commitment they are willing to assume, rang-
ing from voluntary cooperative procedures to generally-agreed, but
non-binding, recommended practices, to binding international design
standards and operating procedures.
D. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL AND DoMEsTic LAw
Private transactions are not appropriate instruments for implementa-
tion of debris mitigation standards in the first instance, although, such
standards will find their way into transactional agreements after they
become mandated by law. For example, if the FCC were to impose a
requirement on satellite licensees to shift the satellite to a higher orbit
at end of life, the requirement would be reflected in the spacecraft per-
formance specifications contained in the procurement contract between
the licensee and the satellite manufacturer.
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS
While there is general agreement among legal experts and govern-
ment officials that current law is doing little to help control or reduce
orbital debris, there is no consensus on how to remedy the situation.
Contending that knowledge and understanding of the debris problem,
as well as mitigation techniques, are incomplete, some experts maintain
that it would be premature to establish standards for spacecraft design
and operation at this point; others warn that inaction may now have
catastrophic consequences later.
Even among those who propose action, there is disagreement on how
to proceed. For example, within the United States, legal experts are not
altogether in agreement on whether to: (1) adopt unilateral measures
first (e.g., through the regulatory mechanisms of the FCC, OCST,
NOAA, and NASA) and subsequently seek acceptance for such mea-
sures at the international level; or (2) seek an international understand-
1991]
216 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y [VOL. 6:203
ing first and then implement the standards domestically. The disadvan-
tage of the former approach is that it may place an unfair burden on
United States commercial spacecraft operators in the world market
competition.
There is also disagreement with respect to the approach to interna-
tional implementation. Some experts maintain that a conference of
spacefaring nations would be preferable to dealing with the matter in
an ITU or COPUOS context since negotiations among countries with
common interests are more likely to have a successful outcome. More-
over, the effort to reach agreement will not be impeded or delayed by
non-spacefaring nations attempting to impose unreasonably strict
standards.
